2015年5月2日星期六

The Plaintiff's Statement of Claims filed on 1 April 2013 (Para 1-24,110) 原告起诉书 (1-24,110段, 2013年4月1号)

1. The plaintiff, Yan Jun, sues Attorney General (AG) of Singapore for Wrongful arrest and False imprisonment (Loss of liberty; Physical injuries, Intentional inflictions of emotional distress; economic loss); Defamation; Assault and Battery and the Use of excessive force; Malicious prosecution and Abuse of process. The nature of the incident is intentional tort and the plaintiff requests for general, aggravated and punitive damages. 

2. On 19 July 2009, the plaintiff was arrested by two policemen for an offence of Personal Protection Order (PPO) Violation at around 9:30am. He was detained and interrogated in Bedok Police Division until bailed out the next day at around 6:30am. The plaintiff was required to return to the station to answer the bail some one month later. When returned as required, the plaintiff was informed by the police that the bail lapsed. On 5 October 2009, Mr. Lim Shao Liang, a senior investigation officer in Bedok Police Division, informed the plaintiff through email that the Police will take no action against him after consultation with Attorney-General’s Chamber (AGC). The plaintiff requested to Supt GTB the names of the two police officers on 6 March 2013 and followed up on 8 March but hasn't received the answer.  

The plaintiff’s account of the incident
3.On the morning on 19 July 2009 in my flat (Simei Street 1, BLK 153, #07-49, Singapore 520153), I quarreled at the kitchen with the Madam YXL, or mother-in-law, over whether a falling lamp should be placed inside the master bedroom or not. I then dialed 999 for assistance in case of possible violence between me and the in-law as happened previously. I then asked the in-law to pass the child, to me and carried the child into the master bedroom and left the door of the master bedroom closed but not locked. I sat in a chair with the child in arms and waited for the police to arrive. 

4.Shortly after settled in the master bedroom, I heard the in-law shouted hurriedly and sharply to Madam Liu Tian, that the stove accessories (built-in gas cooker) were removed. After a few seconds, the door of master bedroom was suddenly opened and Madam Liu rushed into the room towards me. When coming up to me, Madam Liu hit for around 10 seconds violently and repeatedly on my head and left face. I hold the baby tight and raised my left hand to protect myself but didn't fight back. If I had fought back, I wouldn't have been able to hold the child tight and the child would have fallen on the ground. I closed the eyes while Madam Liu was beating me.

5.After several beatings, Madam Liu stopped. Immediately, I run out of the master bed room with the child and stood in the dining room next to the main door but Madam Liu remained in the master bedroom. A few minutes later, two policemen arrived, one was a senior Chinese officer and the other was a junior Malay officer. I pointed to the master bedroom and said in Mandarin “She beat me” but they both ignored my report and went directly into the master bedroom. While the officers talked to Madam Liu, I sat in the sofa in the dining room for a while and later passed the child to the in-law. After a while, the officers and the Madam Liu went of the master bedroom into the kitchen but I didn't hear clearly their conversations. I went into the master bedroom and sat in the same chair and waited for my turn to report to the police officer because I had already called the police earlier in the morning.  

6.While sitting in a chair, I heard clearly the conversations in the dining room between Madam Liu and the senior police officer about whether the PPO was valid. The PPO they referred to was Expedite Order 1179/2009, or the EO thereafter, issued on Madam Liu’s application on 25 June 2009.  The senior officer calculated the days and Madam Liu said hurriedly that “he (me) deliberately did it because he already knew it (the EO was about to expire)”. Then I heard that the senior officer talked to someone on the phone about whether the PPO was valid on that day. After that, all conversations stopped. 

7. I waited for a few minutes to ensure that the conversation really stopped and then walked out of the master bedroom. I saw the senior police officer standing by the main door and I said “it was my turn to speak” while walking up to him. However, the senior officer announced firmly that “You are under arrest for breach of Personal Protection Order”. I was shocked and protested immediately by saying “you only heard a one-sided story” but the senior officer’s rebuked me sharply by saying something like “you have rights to remain silent, and what you said will be used against you in court”.  

8. I was frightened to explain to the senior officer so asked his permission to put on my jeans and T-shirt and wear my shoes and backpack. After I did so, I stretched out my hands for handcuffing and suddenly the senior officer saw the injuries on my left hand and asked but not questioned “how come” and proceeded to twist my arms behind my back and handcuffed me. I didn't resist in any way. 

9. I was led away by two officers down to a police car and forced into the backseat. While in the car, I saw my neighbor walking by so I was sure that she saw me getting into the police car so thought that my image was spoiled. While the senior officer was reporting to someone on the phone outside the car, the junior officer used arm restraints on me inside the car and shortly after I was then brought to Changi General Hospital (or the hospital thereafter). Before I got off, the junior officer used leg restraints on me while I was imaging how embarrassing it would be to walk with police officer’s accompany in front of people in the hospital. I was very reluctant to get off the car but I had no choice but to follow the order. In the hospital, I had to walk step by step with my head up as if I were a martyr because I had to show my innocence. While waited for my turn for the treatment, I noticed nurses, doctors and patients looking at me. 

10.In the treatment the doctor asked me how I got injured and I answered that I was beat by my wife. The doctor when asked about my wrongdoing and the senior officer answered “breach of PPO”, and immediately, the doctor said loudly “small injury”. I felt that the doctor deliberately insulted me so I overcame my fear of the senior police officer and answered back by questioning “who pay for the treatment?” The police officer kept silent and the doctor stammered out something like “administrative staff”, in sharp contrast with the confidence he had before his comments on my injury.  

11.I was placed in an individual room with the junior officer after the treatment. In the absence of the senior officer, I complained that I was actually the victim of the family violence committed by my wife on 23 June 2009. Suddenly the junior officer asked me “why did you beat her (Madam Liu)? “and I answered in surprise “ I didn't beat her”. The officer added that “According to Women’s Charter, even a scratch will be accounted as beating her.” I answered “No, I didn't beat her.” I saw that the junior officer looked surprised. 

12.I was then transported to the Bedok Police Division from the hospital and I remained silence in presence of the senior officer.  When the door was opened and I was about to be brought into the division, I saw that the junior police officer hesitated to speak to the senior officer but he didn't do so while the senior officer looked quite confident. In the division, duty officers asked me whether I had been detained previously and I answered no. Subsequently I was photographed, fingerprinted and partially strip-searched. All my possession was searched and kept by the police and I can still recall how eagerly the police officers there searched my wallet and my bag. I felt that I was really a prisoner and how powerless I was because I had to follow their every single instruction no matter whether I could accept it or not. 

13.I was only allowed to wear T-shirt and the jeans. All other possession including belt, glasses, socks were all kept by the police. I was placed alone in a big cell and was unable to see anything clear without glasses and I felt extremely hopeless while looking around. I couldn't believe what happened to me as I was the victim of family violence and got injured. I was clear that my wife reported to the police that I beat her so definitely she made a false police report. I started worrying about the child because the child would not be taken care of by his mother if something happened to her. I also worried about what would happen to my family. I was so frustrated that I sat on the ground and later lay my back on the ground to make myself feel comfortable. I was in a state in which I was unable to concentrate on anything including sleeping. The police left one set of food and a cup of water at the edge of the cell. When I used the toilet I noticed that drinking water was designed to come from a hole above the squat toilet. It was disgusting to drink water this way but I had to do so in a cell.

14.A Malay guy was later sent to the cell and we exchanged a few word about PPO. He appeared to be familiar with the patrolling policemen and told me that the judge may not publish severely for first PPO violation. He then lay on the ground and slept but I was unable to go to sleep even if I followed him. Each time I was called out of the cell, I was both handcuffed and foot cuffed and I was particularly unhappy with the foot cuff because they hurt me and made me feel pain. The handcuff was pretty tight and I later suffered numbness around the thumb so had to see a doctor. The symptom lasted around 3 months and then disappeared on its own. 

15.I was later interrogated by Investigation Officer C Teo and when I learned it was 1pm I was surprised at my lost the sense of time. I confirmed that I didn't even touch my wife. The first question Mr. Teo asked me is “Are you aware of the PPO (refer to the EO)? “ My answered firmly that “I went to the Family Court on 6th July (or, Return Date) but she (Madam Liu Tian) didn't turn up in court. I also talked to a counsellor in the Family Court on the morning of that day”. Mr. Teo thought for seconds and preceded to inquiry the details of the incident and my particulars. While questioning me, Mr. Teo received a call and he answered in mandarin that “He (me) said he didn't beat (his wife) “. I described the incident and answered all questions. 

16.In the interrogation, Mr. Teo told me that my version of the incident and my wife’s version were two different stories so I’d better tell him the truth. He asked two details of the incident. Mr. Teo asked whether I fought back and flicked over Madam Liu’s face and left her scratches while she was beating me. I answered desperately that “No, I didn't even touch her”. Mr. Teo told me that “Madam Liu walked away from the master bed room after her assault” and I denied immediately and explained that “I run out of the master bed room with the child in arms as soon as Madam Liu stopped beating me”. I also said when the police arrived I was at dining room next to the main door but my wife was in master bed room. At the end of the interrogation, I read the transcripts and corrected grammar mistakes several times before I signed. I also pointed out that the officer mistook my age as 42 and corrected to 33. Before he left, Mr. Teo asked me that “I asked you one more time whether you beat you wife or not”. I answered firmly that I didn't beat Madam Liu. 

17.I was sent back to the cell and was then required to wear only one set of clothes, either T-shirt or the undershirt, which made me realize that it was at night. Despite the Malay guy asked for and was given a blanket, I asked for the same thing but was refused so I had to lie my back down on the cold ground. I was later transferred with the Malay guy to another cell where a group of people arrived a few hours later. I was simply lying down on the ground thinking about what would happened to me until I was called out and was allowed to make a phone call. I finally rang my friend and the police talked to my friend how to get to Bedok Police Division. When I saw my friend at Bedok Station while I was still handcuffed and foot cuffed, I almost came into tears but I managed to hold them back. I was bailed out at around 6:30 on 20 July 2009. I was diagnosed as nerve damage caused by constraints of handcuff later on.

18..At the point I got out of the Bedok Police Division, I was in a state close to mental collapse so I told my friend the whole incident in a Hawker centre nearby. I went to the family Court to check my wife’s attendance on Return Date and was answered that she didn't appear in court. I asked the court for a certification but was refused. I then requested a counselling session and talked to a counsellor what happened to me. I applied for Expedite Order on the same day against Madam Liu Tian (EO 1349/2009) and YXL (EO 1348/2009).  I came across Madam Liu Tian on the same day and received the EO she and YXL applied against me. 

19.The next day I overcame my fear of the police and sent a message via my mobile phone to Mr. Teo about Madam Liu’s non-attendance to the court and later on wrote in to Bedok Police Division for explanations. I was later told that the case was passed along to Mr. Lim Shao Liang, a senior investigator, who informed me via email on 14 Sept 2009 that the case was reported to AGC. I was frightened again and thought that I would be prosecuted, as a lawyer I consulted told me that he was unable to predict what actions police would take against me.  

20.After I returned home, I was angry with what happened to me and stayed restlessly for some one month. I couldn't sit still for a few hours at home unless in sleep and I had to wander around in the street. I consulted with a number of lawyers and even rang the subordinate court but got little assistance. At that time I regularly went to Methodist Welfare Services (Blk 470 Tampines Street 44 #01-194, Singapore 520470) for assistance after my arrest. My family members later said they were scared of me and their fear was confirmed by the counsellor after she and the other counsellor attended the consultation for both I and Madam Liu Tian in late August 2009.   

21.In August I felt that the advice from Methodist Welfare Services was not enough and I had to go back my home town in China to meet my family members. When I got back home, all my friends were all surprised at my tired moral and dishelmed appearance. In early September 2009, I returned to Singapore in response to a job offer of a position that I applied for in May 2009.   

22.On 5 Oct 2009 I received from Mr. Lim an email saying "with consultation with AG Chambers, we have decided to take no further action against you”. Mr. Lim added in the same email “advised you to refrain from violence against your wife”. On 16 Oct and 29 Oct 2009, I sent email twice to Mr. Lim Shao Liang questioning the validity of the EO and the outcome of their investigation but received no reply. 

23.I talked to lawyers and finally inquired AGC through email on 16 March 2012 for the outcome of the investigation of my arrest and on 4 June 2012 AGC explained in email that: 

     a)On 19 July 2009, police officers were present at Block 153, Simei Street 1, #07-49, Singapore, in response to a telephone call made by you at around 9.02am on that day. At the scene, a complaint was made by Mdm Madam Liu Tian that you had breached an Expedited Order dated 25 June 2009. Pursuant to the complaint, the police officers carried out investigations.

    b)Subsequently, upon conclusion of investigations and careful consideration of the matter, the Attorney-General’s Chambers had directed the Police to take no further action against you.

 AGC explained further in the email dated on 5 June 2012 that: 
    a)The Attorney-General’s Chambers is satisfied that, based on the facts and circumstances of the case that were available to the Police on 19 July 2009, there was reasonable suspicion of you being concerned with an offence of Breach of an Expedited Order under Section 65(8) of the Women’s Charter, even though it was subsequently discovered that the Expedited Order against you had been revoked by 19 July 2009.

   b)As we have informed in our email dated 4 June 2012, the Police were directed by the Attorney-General to take no further action against you at the conclusion of the investigations, as no offence had been disclosed.

   c)We regret the anguish the matter has caused you. The authorities will look into refining the processes to prevent future similar occurrences.

24. On 7 June 2012 at 11:26, the plaintiff questioned in email the satisfaction of AGC on the police’s suspicion of the plaintiff’s arrest. In an email replied on the same day at 18:20, AGC claimed that “Please be informed that we have nothing further to add on this matter.” 

...,

Windfall vs. deterrence
110. It is understandable to take large sum punitive damages as a windfall for a plaintiff even with the knowledge that the amount is meant for punishment and deterrence. From a point of view of fairness, the plaintiff would argue it is acceptable and necessary to award punitive damages to function as it is supposed to do. It is clear that the Court is in a conservative position on punitive damages as shown by the cases analysed in earlier discussion. The plaintiff would request the Court to donate directly and anonymously any punitive damages over $200,000, if any, to the state or governmental agencies chosen by the plaintiff.   

Claims
Amount
Notes
Loss of liberty
$60,000
General
$30,000
Aggravated
Assault and battery
$15,000
General
Assault and battery (Humiliation)
$100,000
General
Excessive use of force
$10,000
General
Defamation
$5,000
General
Intentional infliction of emotional distress
$100,000
General
Economic loss
$7,135
non-pecuniary
Malicious prosecution, Abuse of process
$900,000
Punitive (recommended)
Total
$1,227,135


Costs:
Uses
Cost
Time
Medical treatment for thumb numbness
$75
25 July, 2009
Consultation with Family service centre
$60
11 Aug, 27Aug and 4 Sep, 2012
Return to hometown in Sep 2009
$3,000
Sep – Sep 2009
Lost earning
$4,000
July to Sep 2009
Total
$7135

2015年1月1日星期四

Letter of rejection of EMO 2062 of 2014

Dear FJC,

SUM No: MSS 4686/2014, EMO 2062/2014

1.      I refer to the Enforcement Maintenance order EMO 2062/2014 made by Her Honor DJ on 12 December 2014. I received it today.

2.      I do not accept this order. The only reason I hasn't appeal against it is my difficulties in financing appeals. 

Disregard of the facts
3.      In my opinion, Her Honor has completely discarded both parties’ financial situations.  While the husband was without employment in half of his marriage or so, the wife has been working as a nurse since 2005.  Her Honor dismissed my application to vary the maintenance order on the ground that she was unable to vary it because it was affirmed by a Honorable Justice. It is evident that Her Honor’ ground contradicts s 72(1) of the Women’s charter that

72.—(1)  On the application of any person receiving or ordered to pay a monthly allowance under this Part and on proof of a change in the circumstances of that person, his wife or child, or for other good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the court, the court by which the order was made may rescind the order or may vary it as it thinks fit

Incorrect interpretation of jurisdiction
4.      Her Honor’s reasoning that a DJ has no power to overrule a decision made by a High Court Judge is incorrect. In Palvit Singh v Sarawan Kaur [1990] 1 MLJ lvii, Magistrate Daniel Koh distinguished the state of law  in 1990 and overruled the decision made by Wee Chong Jin CJ in Quek Ah Chian v Ng Guan Chng [1968] 1 M.L.J. 255 (See Elements of Family Law in Singapore, by Leong Wai Kum, 1st Ed, 2007, at page 475, Para 2)

Violation of my due process right
5.      While Her Honor put me under examined on oath by the Madam L, Her Honor refused to let me cross-examined Madam L. I believe that there is no way to explain such an violation of a constitutional right of equality before law. As such, the violation of procedural fairness in the hearing guarantees a judicial review. 

My claims
6.      First, I expressly reserve my right to initiate disciplinary tribunal proceedings against Her Honor for her unilateral “cross-examination” under s82A(5) of legal professional act.

7.      Second, I reserve my right to appeal against all orders made by Her Honor on 12 December 2014 after my financial situation gets better. This email severs as evidence to show the reason why I didn't file appeal 14 days after the order was made.  

How correct my reasoning can be?

8.      I brought a case against Attorney-General on last year and my appeal was dismissed by a High Court Judge (See [2013] SGHC 245) and by the Court of Appeal (See 2014 [SGCA] 60).

9.      5 days later (3 December), I sent to the Court “The Appellant’s comments on the Judgment” and reasoned the judgment as “seriously flawed”). On 15 December, the Court replied that “Please be informed that the contents of the email and the attachment have been placed before the Court. The Court will not be responding to the comments found in the attachment”. I pasted The Appellant’s comments on the Judgment for the purpose of this letter.

10.   I request the court to pay attention Her Honor’s conduct.  I request the FJC to acknowledge the receipt of this letter.

11.   Thank you.

Regards,
YJ

2014年12月31日星期三

Yan Jun's Comments on the Judgement of [2014] SGCA 60


The Appellant’s comments on the Judgment of [2014] SGCA 60

Introduction
While Yan Jun brought the suit against the Attorney-General of Singapore on 1 April 2013 for a serious of offences including wrongful arrest and false imprisonment and requested for damages totaling 1.22 million, most of his claims had been struck out by the learned Assistant Registrar (AR) on 3 July 2013. 

Unsatisfied with the learned AR’s reasoning, Yan Jun appealed against the AR’s decision and his appeal was dismissed before a High Court Judge. (See Yan Jun v Attorney-General [2013] SGHC 245). While Yan Jun’s appeal was dismissed again, he furthered his appeal and his case was heard before the Court of Appeal on 9 May 2014 before 3 Judges. 

The judgement had been reserved since 9 May and finally released on 27 November 2014 (See Yan Jun v Attorney-General 2014 [SGCA] 60) but Yan Jun was still unhappy with the judgement. 5 days after he received the judgement, or 3 December 2014, he sent to the Court by email his comments /criticisms in which he reasoned 2014 [SGCA] 60 as "seriously flawed". 

On 15 December 2014, the Court replied that "1.We refer to your email dated 3 December 2014 and the corresponding attachment. 2. Please be informed that the contents of the email and the attachment have been placed before the Court. The Court will not be responding to the comments found in the attachment. 3. Thank you."

As of the date when this post is published (31/12/2014), Yan Jun still considers the reasoning in 2014 [SGCA] 60  seriously flawed. The limitation period in police misconduct cases is 6 years as the causes of action is not "breach of duty" but "loss of qualified immunity". As for the Interpretation of Article 9(4) of the Constitution of Singapore, the 48 hours run from the point of arrest according to the Presumption of Innocence,

Yan Jun's comments/criticisms on 2014 [SGCA] 60  are as follows: 

****************
1.     It seems to the Appellant that the Court and the Appellant examined the same issues from a different angle so they reached different conclusions.  

Does “every man” standard apply to police officers performing their duties?
2.     The Court examined tortious liability in general and concluded that the phrase “breach of duty” in s24A (1) encompassing all torts[1]. The Court’s position can be summed up with what Lord Denning observed in Letang that “there is a duty owed by every man not to injure his neighbor in a way that is forbidden by law”[2]. The Court further ruled that this “every man” standard did apply to police officers performing their duties and as such, “if the police officer did not owe any duty to the Appellant, the Appellant would not have a cause of action against the police officer in the first palace[3].

3.     The Appellant’s analysis focused on tortious liability in police misconduct and concluded that the “every man” standard didn’t apply to police officers performing their duties. In other words, a police officer doesn’t owe a suspect a duty not to injure him when arresting him[4]. The cause of action in the present case is not “breach of duty” but “loss of qualified immunity”.

Qualified immunity
4.     Police officials performing their duties are shielded from liabilities.[5]The recognition of a qualified immunity defense balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably[6]. Police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless “(1) the officers’ conduct violates a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the conduct, such that (3) an objectively reasonable officer would have understood that the conduct violated that right.”[7]

5.     In the present case, the SPF officer arrested the Appellant for a PPO violation based on an expired Expedite Order (EO) so he violated the Appellant’s right to liberty. This right to liberty was clear established in the Constitution at the point of the arrest and an objectively reasonable officer certainly would not make an arrest without reasonable suspicions. While this SPF officer may argue that a reasonable police officer would not necessarily know specific family law, however, a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. For these reasons, the SPF officer lost his qualified immunity at the point of the arrest as a result of his mistake of law.

6.     While any injury caused by an ordinary citizen constitutes a tort by default, any injury caused by police officers on suspects are lawful by default unless the officers loss their qualified immunity. False imprisonments in police misconduct is mostly founded on “loss of qualified immunity” as a result of the officer’s mistake of law. Such cases fall into the category of strict liability tort.

“Voluntary act” test for “breach of duty”
7.     What criterion is used to determine a person’s duty not to injure the others? In Hoare, the defendant Hoare was held to have breached his duty not to injure the others during his sexual assault actions. But would Hoare have breached this very duty if he had been an insane person? The Appellant would answer in the negative because insane persons are totally unable to be responsible for their actions[8]. Their involuntary actions make them absolute immune from the duty not to injure the others. While an ordinary citizen acts in his own free wills and for his own benefits, a police officer performing his duty in the public interest and consequently, the officer is not allowed to act in his own free will.

8.     Like insane persons’ actions, police officers’ actions are involuntary in the sense that officers must act on objective reasonableness such as reasonable suspicion but not their subjective beliefs. It is evident that even if an officer subjectively considers a suspect innocent, he has no choice but to arrest the suspect if he has reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect has committed a crime. In other words, police officers on duty don’t owe suspects a duty not to injure them.

9.     As the learned author of “The law of torts in Singapore” observed that “As a fundamental starting point (of intentional torts), the defendant’s act must be voluntaryie, a result of conscious acts, in contrast to the acts of a sleepwalker or an intoxicated defendant”[9]. If a person was arrested on a reasonable suspicion but his charge was later dropped due to insufficient evidence, he was unable to bring a suit against the police. Since the police officers were immune from the duty not to injure a suspect, this person didn’t have a cause of action.

Can police misconduct be founded on “breach of duty”?
10.  Yes, it can as long as the misconduct is made out of the police officer’s own free will such as malice but not his objective reasonableness. Qualified immunity and immunity from the duty not to injure a suspect are not the same thing. The former stems from police officers’ duties to prevent crimes and the latter is up to officers’ state of mind. If an officer made a mistake of law but doesn’t use his own free will in performing his duty, like the officer in the present case, he will loss his qualified immunity but will still be immune from the duty not to injure the suspect.

11.  This point can be easily illustrated in the following case. While a police officer personally didn’t believe that a suspect had violated a PPO, he reluctantly arrested the suspect because he had reasonable suspicions. If the PPO was found out to be expired later on, the officer certainly lost his qualified immunity at the point of arrest as a result of mistake of law. But he didn’t have a duty not to injure the suspect when arresting the suspect because his actions were involuntary (reluctantly arrested him). Since the officer lost his immunity, he could be simplified as an ordinary citizen at the point of arrest. He didn’t use his own free will, so his action was involuntary. 

12.  In the present case, the SPF officers arrived at the Appellant’s flat in response to the Appellant’s call but refused to take the Appellant’ report so the officer’s action was amount to malice. However, the case was still caused by the SPF officer’s “mistake of law” because taking the report would not change his decision but his knowledge of the expiration of the EO would certainly do.   

Why doesn’t a police officer owe a suspect a duty not to injure him?
13.  Winfield's definition of tort is: “Tortuous liability arises from the breach of a duty primarily fixed by law; this duty is towards persons generally.” If law primarily empowers a police officer to arrest a suspect on a reasonable suspicion, the same law is unable to make, in a primary way, the same police officer under a duty not to hurt a suspect when putting him under arrest. If a police officer has such a duty, any arrest will be both legal and illegal. It is legal in the sense that the arrest is justified by a reasonable suspicion. It is illegal because any arrest will inflict injury so any arresting officer breaches his duty. 

14.  For above reasons, the Appellant reserves his opinion that false imprisonment in police misconduct is a strict liability tort founded on “loss of qualified immunity” but not “breach of duty”. The limitation period is 6 years, pursuant to s 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163).  

Constitutional right—Article 9(4)
15.  For three reasons, the Appellant respectfully disagrees with the Court’s analysis on Article 9(4). First, the analysis contradicted the well-established principle of the purpose of an arrest. Second, the “public interest” justification is untenable because a judicial review of the legality of the arrest and the need for police investigation are logically independent so cannot be balanced. Third, the legality of “reasonable time” constructed in the judgment has violated the Presumption of Innocence.  

16.  The Court started its analysis of Art 9(4) with Prof Thio Li-Ann’s statement that the Art 9(4) was meant to review “the legality of an arrest and detention[10]. Next, the Court explained that “It will be evident from the language of Art 9(4) that it requires an arrested person, if not released earlier, to be brought before a Magistrate without unnecessary delay”[11]. The explanation suggests that the right against arbitrary arrest doesn’t apply to every arrested person, which contradicts the principle of equality before the law. 

“Public interest” justification
17.  However, the Court went on to explain that that “It is, however, also plainly the case that Art 9(4) does not confer an arrested person with an unqualified right to be brought before a Magistrate immediately upon his arrest[12] and “in our view, therefore, Art 9(4) requires the right of the individual against arbitrary detention upon arrest to be balanced against the need to afford the police reasonable time in which to carry out their investigation[13].

18.  With respect, the Appellant is unable to agree with this justification. Police investigations after arrests are meant to look for evidence to lay a formal charge against suspects, however, a judicial review of the legality of the arrest concerns only with reasonable suspicion/probable cause, which has been established before an arrest. Judicial reviews and the investigations are independent unless the latter is meant to establish the former.

19.  In addition, police officers only close their investigation after a formal charge is brought against the suspect, regardless of the completion of the judicial review.  In theory, an arrested person needs to be taken to the court twice. One for a judicial review and the other for being formally charged. In actual practice, the two hearings are usually combined into one. That may explain why the Court thought that a judicial review, like laying a formal charge, would prevent police officers from carrying out investigation.

20.  In the past, judicial reviews must be done by taking the arrested physically to the court. Nowadays, they can be easily done by virtue means such as submission reasonable suspicion electronically to the court for approval in the absence of the suspect, while the police investigation is being carried out.

Legality of the “reasonable time”

21.  Finally, the Court held that “the right of the arrested person is more accurately characterized as one to not be detained for a period that is unreasonable in the circumstances, and which in any event does not exceed 48 hours, unless he is brought before a Magistrate. If the arrested person is released within a reasonable time after his arrest, he doesn’t have to be brought before a Magistrate” [14].

22.  According to the Court’s analysis, the police procedure for a judicial review is as follows. Step 1, Police officers arrest a suspect on reasonable suspicions; Step 2, Police officers detain the arrested person for a period of “reasonable time’, regardless whether the period of this “reasonable time” is fixed or flexible; Step 3, the police officer must make a decision to release the arrested person or not.  If the decision is made before the end of the “reasonable time”, the arrested person doesn’t need to be taken before a Magistrate; Step 4, If the arrested person is detained beyond the “reasonable time”, the detention will be considered “unreasonable” so the police must brought the arrested person before a Magistrate for the judicial review.

23.  With great respect, the Appellant disagree with the Court’s opinion and if there really is a concept of “reasonable time”, the amount of this “reasonable time” must be zero minute based on Presumption of Innocence. In the Court’s opinion, what the Constitution protected is not a right against arbitrary arrest and detention, but a right against unlawful detention that is “unreasonably long”. Supposing that a police officer arrests a suspect by handcuffing him and immediately release the suspect to test the officer’s reasonable suspicion. If the Court is right, this officer certainly can lawfully carry out an arbitrary arrest without report tot the Court, because point arrest certainly cannot make a detention that is “unreasonably long”.   

24.  The Court’s opinion has raised two issues. One is the purpose of an arrest. What is a police officer supposed to do at the point of the arrest? To take the suspect to the court in the hope to lay a formal charge against him, or to release him before the end of “reasonable time”? If a person can be arrested without being taken to a court, the purpose of the arrest certainly contradicts the well-established principle that “the purpose of the arrest is for further investigation by a Magistrate[15] and the very purpose laid down in “Commentaries of the laws of England” by Blackstone[16]. If the time spent on an arrested person by the police is roughly divided into “time for registration” (necessary and unavoidable delay) and time for investigation, the “reasonable time” certainly falls into the category of “time for investigation”. Therefore, it is safe to draw a conclusion from the Court’s opinion that the purpose of an arrest is police investigation.  

25.  The second issue that the Court opinion raised is the legality of “reasonable time”. Prof Thio Li- Ann’s statement made it clear that every arrest is unlawful by default until proved lawful before a court, which is based on the Presumption of Innocence, or the foundation of the Constitution.

26.  The Court reasoned that “If the arrested person is released within a reasonable time after his arrest, he doesn’t have to be brought before a Magistrate”. It is evident that this “reasonable time” detention starts from the point of an arrest and ends at the point of release. If the Court considers this “reasonable time” detention lawful, the arrested person will be “guilty of law” during this period because the police always consider a suspect “guilty of a crime”. This justification is against the Presumption of Innocence. In fact, if the “reasonable time” detention is lawful, any arrest will be lawful as long as the suspect is released within 48 hours. The amount of “reasonable time” must be within 48hrs.

27.  If the Court considers the “reasonable time” detention unlawful, the Appellant feels difficult to understand how the Court gets power to intentionally allow unlawfulness to take place. The Court is supposed to uphold the rule of law and a purpose and function of law is to protect various liberties and rights. The Appellant would humbly request the Court to explain the concept, the purpose and the determination/computation of the “reasonable time” in the present case to justify why 21hours is within the “reasonable time”. [emphasis added]

Defamation
28.  With respect, the Appellant has difficulty to understand the Court’s ruling that “we agree with Mr. Khoo’s submission that the proper defendant to such claim is the doctor himself or his employers[17]”. While the doctor shouted out “small injury” at the Appellant, the Appellant did suffer small injuries so the doctor’s words were insulting but not defamatory in nature. The Appellant would suggest that the doctor’s words can hardly make a defamation case.

29.  As for the defence of qualified privilege, the Appellant humbly disagree. There is always a relationship between a police officer (as an authority or trust) and an ordinary citizen as long as the officer is performing his duty to prevent social harms. A police officer is always protected by his qualified immunity and in no case can a police officer has a qualified privilege other than his qualified immunity.  Since the SPF officer had lost his qualified immunity at the point of the arrest due to his mistake of law, he was not preventing but actually committing a crime in the treatment room.

30.  Technically, he was not a policeman with trust and authority but a man in police uniform as far as the unlawful arrest is concerned. As a result, he made no difference with an ordinary citizen such as a patient or a cleaner and consequently, he was unable to have any interest or duty to communicate the information with the doctor. The Appellant humbly suggest that defence of qualified privilege fail in this case.  

Summary
The Appellant deeply respect the Judgment but would like to reserve his positions on all his claims except the claim of defamation.



[1] The Judgment of [2014] SGCA 60, Para 61.
[2] IbidPara 36.                                                                                                               
[3] IbidPara 63.
[4] The Appellant’s Case for CA 142/2013, Para 43-46.
[5] Sorrell v. McGuigan, 38 Fed. Appx. 970, 973 (4th Cir.2002), Part II. internal quotations omitted
[6] Pearson v Callahan (No. 07-751) 494 F. 3d 891, 2009, Part II A.
[7] Sorrell v. McGuigan, 38 Fed. Appx. 970, 973 (4th Cir.2002), Part II. internal quotations omitted
[8] The Appellant’s Case for CA 142/2013, Para 46.
[9] The Law of Torts in Singapore. Academy Publishing 2011, Page. 37, Para. 02.021
[10] The Judgment of [2014] SGCA 60, Para 90.
[11] IbidPara 91.
[12] IbidPara 92.
[13] IbidPara 92.
[14] Ibid, Para 95.
[15] The Appellant’s Case for CA 142/2013, Para 59, 64, citing Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (20th Ed, 2010), Para 15-78, [PBOA, Volume I, Tab 12]
[16] Ibid, Para 58, citing “Commentaries on the laws of England” (Vol 4, Chapter 21), [PBOA, Volume I, Tab 10]
[17] Ibid, Para 102.