1.
Singapore
is generally believed to have one of the most fair legal systems in the world. In
2010, Singapore was ranked top in the world by the World Justice Project (WJP) for
access to civil justice in the high-income countries group. In February 2018, Singapore
was still ranked 13th by the WJP in global rule of law index. However,
human rights groups see Singapore’s judicial system as oppressive and the
Western Press thinks Singapore’s remarkable economic success has been achieved
at the cost of fundamental civil liberties.
2.
So
is Singapore’s legal system as oppressive as human rights groups have claimed
or as fair and transparent as its top ranking has suggested?
My
opinion
3.
The
essential function of the Singapore’s legal system is to protect the ruling
People’s Action Party (PAP) government’s interests at the expense of justice. Although
it is extremely difficult to establish and legitimize authoritarian rule, the ruling
PAP has succeeded by taking complete control of Singapore’s legal system.
4.
Most
people may disagree with me on the grounds that they have never felt that their
freedom was restricted by the so-called authoritarian PAP government. There is also
a prevailing view that the use of repression by the government is against
political opponents only so an ordinary person in Singapore can live his own
life as harmonious as possible with the government if he doesn’t care too much about
his right to free speech and expression.
5.
For
three reasons, these common misconceptions are wrong. First, people haven’t complained
the loss of their freedom because they are not aware that their fundamental
rights have been deliberately curtailed by the court. Secondly, legal academics
are generally reluctant to criticize judgements no matter how harsh and arbitrary
these judgements are. Thirdly, the mainstream media is heavily controlled by
the government so people have no access to the reports of judicial misconduct and
judicial corruption.
6.
In
my opinion, Tey Tsun Hang, a former National University of Singapore law
professor, arguably made the first in-depth analysis of Singapore’s legal
system. He observed that “Despite its small size, Singapore occupies a position
of special significance in the debate on the relationship between economic
development and political, social and legal institutions. The ruling People's
Action Party (PAP) of Singapore legitimises its authoritarian political regime
- and insulates it from substantive scrutiny - via a three pronged strategy:
first, through its tightly controlled media and communication channels;
secondly, by delivering an admirable economic performance and, creating and
maintaining an awe-inspiring standard of living; and thirdly - and most
importantly - through its legal institutions. However, there are profound
logical flaws and stark absences of consistency in the judgements that help
secure this legal state of affairs”. [1]
7.
It
should note that Tey Tsun Hang clearly stated in his article that “One could be
tempted to speculate on the partiality or otherwise of the Singapore judiciary
in moulding the law of contempt of court” and his article “does not seek to do
any of this, nor does it intend to”.[2] In
2013, he was embroiled in a high-profile sex-for-benefits case with a student and
he claimed that the case was politically motivated.[3]
8.
In
the following paragraphs, I will present convincing evidence to explain how an
ordinary person’s fundamental rights are constantly being violated by Singapore’s
legal system in the interests of the PAP government.
The 1st line of evidence: The legalization
of arbitrary arrests by police
9.
In
this section, I will explain how and why the Supreme Court legitimized the
arbitrary arrest and detention by police. In other words, everyone in Singapore
has been deprived of their fundamental right against arbitrary arrest and
detention as a result of the bias on the part of the Supreme Court towards the
government.
10. In the case of Yan Jun v
Attorney-General [2014] SGCA 60, the Supreme Court definitely ruled that
the arrest at issue was unlawful and the government should pay the victim
damages. However, the Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the entire case and
ordered the victim to pay $30,000 in legal costs to the government. The Supreme
Court didn’t award a single cent to the victim.
11. The root of this
miscarriage of justice was the fact that the case raised an issue of whether
the late Lee Kuan Yew in 1984 had misinterpreted the Article 9(4) of the
Constitution of Singapore, or the right against arbitrary arrest and detention.
While the late Lee Kuan Yew’s interpretation directly contradicted the foundation
of the Constitution, or the presumption of innocence, the Supreme Court still
ruled in favour of the government. That explains why the Supreme Court has so
far absolutely declined to confirm its judgement.
12. When the victim
accused the Supreme Court of bias towards the government and consequently
refused to attend the subsequent hearings, the Supreme Court deliberately dismissed
the entire case with the intention that the victim would voluntarily accept its
misjudgement and the Lee Kuan Yews’ misinterpretation. This explains why the Supreme
Court and the government have categorically refused to bring contempt
proceedings against the victim in response to the victim’s numerous public
protests against the Supreme Court over judicial corruption.
13. The information in
detail can be found in YouTube video "Judicial corruption in Singapore".[4]
The 2nd line of evidence: The arbitrary use
of maintenance orders against the husband
14. In this section, I
will explain how and why the Family Justice Courts (FJCs) and the Supreme Court
have purposely used maintenance orders issued during the course of the marriage
to satisfy the wife’s financial needs at the expense of justice. This drastic
measure has effectively shifted the government’s responsibility to provide
welfare benefit to the married women with low earning capacity to their
husbands.
15. In Singapore, the Women’s
Charter, or the family law, requires a husband to provide reasonable
maintenance to his wife during the marriage. Section 69 (1) of the Women’s
Charter reads that “The court may, on the application of a wife, and on due
proof that her husband has neglected or refused to provide reasonable
maintenance for her, order the husband to pay a monthly allowance or a lump sum
for the maintenance of that wife”.[5]
16. It should note
that section 46(1) of the Women’s Charter precisely specifies rights and duties
of the husband and the wife during the marriage: “Upon the solemnization of
marriage, the husband and the wife shall be mutually bound to co-operate with
each other in safeguarding the interests
of the union and in caring and providing for the children.”[6]
17. These two clauses
are consistent with each other. If a husband fails to reasonably maintain his
wife, he will breach his duty to safeguard the interests of the union or family
so his wife will be in a position to exercise her right to safeguard the
interests of the family by taking out an application to the FJCs for
maintenance from her husband. For the same reason, if a wife misbehaved herself
by committing adultery or deserting or abusing her husband, her husband will be
in a position to exercise his right to protect the interests of the family by refusing
to provide her with reasonable maintenance even if his wife is in financial
needs. If this husband does maintain his wife, he will breach his duty
specified in s 46(1) by acing against the interests of the union.
18. To almost
everyone’s surprise, both the FJCs and the Supreme Court are of opinion that a
wife is entitled to maintenance from her husband during the course of the
marriage, regardless of the financial support her husband has already provided and
her own misconduct. The court’s position can be easily found by taking a look
at the standard application procedure set out on the website of the FJCs.[7]
Although a judge will hear the case and determine the quantum of maintenance on
the basis of both party’s financial condition shown in their bank and CPF
statements, salary slips, IRAS Notices of Assessments and lists of personal
monthly expenses, the judge doesn’t touch on the husband’s fault, or whether he
has failed to provide his wife with reasonable maintenance.
19. It is evident that
the courts simply saw the provision of maintenance as a husband’s mandatory
duty to satisfy his wife’s financial needs but not a husband’s right to protect
the interests of the union. This extremely simplified position can be easily
proved wrong. If a husband puts all his income into his wife’s personal bank
account, his wife will not be in a position to apply for maintenance because this
wife has a full control of the financial resources of the family.
20. It was Professor
Leong Wai Kum, a law professor in the National University of Singapore (NUS)
and a pioneer in family law, who argued that the husband ought to maintain
misbehaved wives during the marriage. In 1979, Prof. Leong made an interesting
observation that “These
[misconduct-based] defenses are objectionable because they reflect a faulty
analysis of marriage as comprising no more than a series of rights and
duties---that breach of the wife’s “duty” of fidelity ought to result in the
loss of her “right” to maintenance.”[8]
21. In 1987, Prof.
Leong explained further that “It is quite clear that a wife need not lose her
claim for maintenance just because she has conducted herself badly during the
course of the marriage although, of course, the court may take this into
account in considering the quantum or the duration of the order. The commission
of adultery or desertion need no longer disqualify a needy wife from an order
for maintenance from her former husband. The reference to this new thinking by
the Minister is thus of much significance. Surely
if a man may be ordered to maintain a woman who is no longer his wife despite
the fact that she misconducted herself during the course of the marriage there
is all the more reason to make him maintain her while she is still his wife”[9].
22. Tan Cheng Han, a
former dean of the Faculty of Law of the NUS, agreed with Prof. Leong and
further explained in 2000 that “The 1980 amendments introduced the concept of
'no-fault' divorce. As such, it is open to the courts to grant maintenance
under sections 113 and 114 of the Charter even if the wife has committed
adultery or deserted her husband. If the
courts can order maintenance in favour of an ex-wife who has misconducted
herself, they must equally be able to do so where the parties are still married”.[10]
23. Prof. Tan clearly
pointed out that Prof. Leong’s opinion was accepted in 1990 by the court in Palvit Singh v Sawaran Kaur[11]
where the Magistrate approved a wife’s application for maintenance from her
husband despite she deserted her husband.[12] In
addition, in Yip Mei Ling (mw) v. Tan Thiam Chye[13],
the then District Judge Koh Juat Jong didn't subject the wife's misconduct, or
the alleged irresponsible actions of breaking up the family, to the wife's duty
to safeguard the interests of the family and ruled that her husband must
provide her with maintenance.
24. It should note
that in Singapore a wife doesn’t owe her husband a duty of fidelity at all and
it is universally accepted that a wife should not commit adultery in the
interests of the family. It is wrong for legal experts to assume that the wife
and the husband have exactly the same rights and duties during the marriage and
after divorce. Given the fact that the breakup of the marriage completely
erases the interests of the union, “no-fault” divorce is not applicable to
maintenance applications during the course of the marriage. The husband’s duty
to provide maintenance to her ex-wife is an obligation at common law and the
Parliament hasn’t specified the purpose of maintenance for ex-wife. In sharp
contrast, the purpose of maintenance during the marriage is precisely defined
as “to safeguard the interests of the union”.
25. On Sep 11, 2012, I
carefully explained to the FJCs and the Supreme Court that their opinion about
the maintenance application during marriage was wrong but there was no answer.
In April 2013, I informed Prof. Leong of the flaws in her logic behind her
position, she didn’t reply. On May 28, 2014, I emailed my criticisms of the
judgement in the case of Chan Tin Sun v Fong Quay Sim [2014] SGHC 97 to
Chinese-language newspaper Lianhe Zaobao. In this letter, I clearly explained
why both the Supreme Court and the Prof. Leong Wai Kum were wrong in
understanding the maintenance orders issued during the marriage. There was no response.
26. As of today, the FJCs
are still imposing injustice on the husband by issuing arbitrary maintenance
orders. Even worse is the fact that judges find themselves in a tricky
situation when processing maintenance applications taken out by the elder
parent under Maintenance of
Parents Act
(Chapter 167B). The key issue here remains the same: Who bears the burden to
prove that the parent is unable to maintain himself adequately so he is in a
positon to apply for maintenance from his child? The parent or the child?
27. The provision of
reasonable maintenance to the wife, to the child and to the parent is a right
in the first place for a married person to safeguard the interests of the family.
However, the court has arbitrarily made it an absolute duty. Given the fact
that the young parent is legally required to maintain the child, the husband to
maintain the wife, and the child to maintain their elder parents, the Supreme
Court and the FJCSs deserve credit for legally relieving the government’s
responsibility to provide welfare benefit to needy individuals and families by
way of misinterpreting the law.
The 3rd line of evidence: The court’s denial
of the government’s duty to ensure road users’ right to safety
28. In this section, I
will explain how the Supreme Court has in the case of Asnah bte Ab Rahman v Li Jianlin [2016] SGCA 16[14] helped
the government evade its responsibility to ensure road users’ safety while
crossing the road. To this end, the majority judges, Chao Hick Tin JA (as he
then was) and Quentin Loh J, ruled that even if pedestrians had a green light
at signalized pedestrian crossing, pedestrians still had to fulfil their duty
to safeguard their own safety by checking oncoming vehicles to assess the risk
of being knocked down by the vehicles, regardless of whether motorists were
engaging in negligent/careless driving or reckless/wanton driving.[15]
The
lights were green in Mr Li's favour when he was knocked down by a cab driver in
2011 at the crossing in Bukit Batok West Avenue 5 (above). In 2014, the High
Court found the driver fully to blame for the accident. ST PHOTO [16]
The issue
29. The only issue in Asnah is whether pedestrians should take
responsibility for their own safety at signalized pedestrian crossings when
they have a green light and act in strict accordance with the law. The exact
issue, as the minority judge Sundaresh Menon CJ pointed out, is whether a
pedestrian, who has crossed a significant portion of a controlled pedestrian
crossing, should be held to be contributorily negligent in circumstances where [17]:
(a)
the
pedestrian crossing lights were in the pedestrian’s favour throughout;
(b)
the
lights had been in the pedestrian’s favour for a considerable period of time by
the time of the collision;
(c)
the
pedestrian was knocked down by a motorist who for some inexplicable reason
wholly failed to see the traffic lights and so not only did not stop but did
not even slow down;
(d)
and
the motorist has admitted that she was driving dangerously and has been convicted
of an offence for so doing.
The majority opinion
30. The majority judges
ruled that victim in this case contributed to the car-pedestrian accident by
deliberately putting himself at the risk of accidents although the victim had a
green light.
31. The majority
turned the issue of contributory negligence into 3 consecutive questions. The first
question is whether a pedestrian owes himself a responsibility to check for
oncoming traffic before entering a signalized pedestrian crossing even when the
lights are in his favour. The second question is whether the pedestrian had in
these circumstances a duty to keep a proper lookout before stepping onto the
second half of the road. The third question is whether the pedestrian had in
fact failed to keep a proper lookout before stepping onto the second half of
the road and failed to safeguard against the risk of oncoming traffic.[18]
32. In a three-step
manner, the majority answered the 1st question in the affirmative.
In the 1st step, the majority assumed that all traffic accidents at
signalized pedestrian crossings were caused by negligent driving and turned the
1st question into a question about “whether the pedestrian's right
of way within a signalised crossing entitles him to also assume that all
motorists would obey the law and drive in a reasonable manner”.[19]
33. In the 2nd
step, on the basis of a report by a Koays Consulting Pte Ltd,[20]
the majority accepted the view that “the invention of the traffic light was for
the government to resolve the issue of rapid growth of vehicular traffic”. Subsequently,
the majority reasoned that “Given the obvious risks posed by fast moving
vehicular traffic, traffic signals and pedestrian crossings together formed a
compromise of sorts between pedestrians’ and motorists’ respective interests in
the utilisation of road spaces”.[21] Therefore,
the majority concluded that “the signalized pedestrian crossings mitigate road
dangers rather than eliminate them altogether”[22]
and then used this conclusion as a defence against the well-establish position
that “pedestrian crossings are meant to be safe havens in which pedestrians can
cross roads without having to pay "undue attention" to vehicular
traffic”.[23]
34. In the 3rd
step, the majority cited some statistics, 2 newspaper reports and parliament
speeches on negligent driving to show that pedestrians’ risk of being knocked
down by a motorist running a red light was a sufficiently foreseeable. As such,
pedestrians owed themselves a duty to check for oncoming traffic. In response
to the argument that pedestrians’ had a statutory right of way over motorists
when traffic lights were in pedestrians’ favor so they didn’t have a duty to
check for oncoming traffic, the majority cited rule 22 of Highway Code and
insisted that the spirit of rule 22 required pedestrians to take reasonable
care for their own safety even at controlled crossings[24].
35. Unfortunately,
rule 22 required pedestrians not to use controlled crossings until the traffic
in front of them came to a standstill.
If rule 22 was applied in the strictest sense, pedestrians must start to step onto
a crossing after oncoming traffic stopped completely and thus they wouldn’t
have sufficient time to cross the road. To fix this flaw, the majority changed
the standard for assessing a standstill from an objective “complete stop of
traffic” to a subjective “slowing down of traffic” on the grounds that “statutes
are to be interpreted in a manner that promotes the purpose or object
underlying its enactment”. [25] This way, the majority proved that a
pedestrian had a duty to check for oncoming traffic in order to fulfil his duty
to safeguard his own safety.
36. It should note
that both the majority [26] and
the Appellant (taxi driver) [27] were
of opinion that pedestrians ‘duty to safeguard their own safety under rule 22
of the Highway Code was applicable to a car accident caused by both negligent
or careless driving and reckless or wanton driving.
37. The majority went
on to determine whether the victim in this case had fulfilled his duty to
safeguard his own safety when he reached the central divider and started to
step onto the 2nd half of the crossing. The judges accepted the taxi
driver’s estimation that the speed of taxi was 55km/h (experts’ estimation was
40-68km/h) and roughly calculated that it took 1 to 1.5 seconds for the victim
to walk second or third step past the centre-divider before he was hit by the
taxi. The majority then calculated the taxi was probably about 15–23m away from
the victim at the time when the victim reached the central divider and was
about to step onto the 2nd half of the crossing. The braking
distance, or the distance that the taxi would travel if the taxi driver fully
applied the brakes at the point when the victim reached the central divider to
when the taxi came to a complete stop, was estimate to be a few metres more
than 23m at the very most.[28]
38. The majority confidently
concluded that “Any reasonable person upon seeing a vehicle hurtling towards him
at that speed and within such close proximity with no signs of slowing down
would hesitate to step into the path of the vehicle. If the Respondent had
checked, it would have been apparent that the vehicle was not going to stop in
good time, and he would not have continued his journey across the second half
of the crossing. Based on the premises we have examined; it was evident that
the Respondent did not check for approaching vehicular traffic. Even if he did,
he clearly failed to make a reasonable assessment of the risks posed by the
approaching vehicle.”[29]
My criticism of the majority opinion
39. I think the
minority opinion is correct. As explained in the grounds set out below, pedestrian
crossings are meant to be safe havens for road users. In sharp contrast to
majority’s and the Appellant’s positon that rule 22 of Highway Code is
applicable to car-pedestrian accidents caused by both negligent/careless
driving and reckless/wilful/wanton driving, rule 22 is not applicable to road users in utilization of signalized
pedestrian-crossings because the so-called duty to safeguard one’s own safety must
be subjected to the fundamental duty not to hurt others, or the footing on
which English tort law stands.
40. The majority opinion
went wrong in two ways. First, the majority mistakenly chose contributory
negligence as the starting point to analyse accidents occurred at controlled crossings.
Given the fact that such car accidents can be caused by both negligent and
reckless driving and it is well established that contributory negligence is not
a defence for reckless driving[30],
the correct starting point is “breach of duty” construed by Lord Denning in Letang.
41. The phrase “breach
of duty” was construed by Lord Denning in Letang:
“Our whole law of tort today proceeds on the footing that there is a duty owed
by every man not to injure his neighbour in a way that is forbidden by law.
Negligence is a breach of such a duty. So is nuisance. …[so is] malicious
prosecution.”[31]
Given the fact that Singapore's legal system is based on the English common law
system, the government must lay down the law in such a way that an ordinarily
prudent person is not in a position to injure his neighbour as long as he acts
in strict accordance with the law.
42. In a car-pedestrian
accident, both pedestrians and motorists unavoidably breach their duty not to
hurt others because both parties get hurt physically or emotionally no matter
who is at fault. So when it came to crossing the road, there were at least two
ways for the government to fulfil its duty to ensure that road users are in a
position to fulfil their fundamental duty not to hurt their neighbours. One way
was to build overhead bridges or underpasses so pedestrians and motorists could
share the road space without coming into contact with each other. The other way
was to control traffic with traffic lights and pedestrian crossings. To this
end, the government must impose strict safety requirements to ensure that only road
users who have a green light can legally cross the road. As a result, the
danger of hurting others or being hurt can be eliminated altogether for road
users and the safe movement of vehicles is guaranteed.
43. The majority considerably
deviated from the law relating “breach of duty” construed in Letang. The above analysis of the
“breach of duty” clearly shows that the primary function of traffic lights and
pedestrian crossings is not simply to settle the issue of heavy traffic volume
but to facilitate the safe movement
of vehicles and to avoid collision. So the government on the one hand is able to
ensure that English tort law is still on a sound footing when it is applied to disputes
resulting from car-pedestrian accidents, and on the other hand is able to settle
the issue of heavy traffic volume.
44. In other words, signalized
pedestrian crossings are meant to be safe havens in which pedestrians can cross
roads without having to pay "undue attention” to vehicular traffic. “Fool-proof”
in the sense of qualitative measures such as traffic lights or traffic police
hand signals must be used for the government to ensure the safety of road users
from all walk of life.
45. Secondly, the
majority misunderstood the nature of the risk assessment standard. The standard
for pedestrians to assess the risk of being knocked down by oncoming vehicles
before they step onto a crossing is subjective.
Given the fact that pedestrians are from all walks of life, assessment
results are supposed to be at variance or even contradictory with pedestrians’
age, gender, education, driving experience, physical conditions such as
eyesight, hearing etc. However, the court can only use one objective standard to assess the risk. It is well-established that
what the court can determine is whether pedestrians should have known of the risk but not whether they knew of the risk.[32]
46. The majority argued
that the replacement of the objective standard of “complete stop of traffic
with a subjective standard of “slowing down of traffic” was able to fix the
flaw they encounter while interpreting rule 22 of the Highway Code. However,
this argument is misconceived. The standard for risk assessment must be
‘fool-proof” in the sense of qualitative but not quantitative so the issue
about whether pedestrians have fulfilled his duty to safeguard against danger can
be objectively assessed by the court.
47. The objective
assessment, or the quantitative remodelling of the accident, is unfit for
measuring whether the pedestrian fulfilled his duty in this case because
quantitative assessment results are highly susceptible to the selection of key
parameters such as the speed of the taxi, the time that the victim used to walk
2 to 3 steps past the central divider, etc. Although the majority frankly
admitted that the objective standard of care they preferred couldn't be applied
to wheel-chair bound or a very young child, they chose to leave this issue to
be considered in the future on the grounds that this area of law remains
unsettled and is evolving.[33]
48. The fact is that
while the majority judge confidently reasoned that “it was evident that the Respondent did not check for approaching vehicular
traffic. Even if he did, he clearly failed to make a reasonable assessment of
the risks posed by the approaching vehicle”, this argument couldn’t even
convince the minority. In fact, within 1 to 1.5 seconds, it is not possible for
an ordinary person to estimate the speed of the car and to rough calculate the
braking distance of the taxi in the present case.
49. As the minority reasoned
that “It should be noted that at 55 km/h (being the appellant’s admitted speed)
and 68 km/h (being the high end of her own expert’s estimate) the traffic
lights would have been visible to the appellant for between 8 and 10 seconds
prior to the collision. To remain oblivious to the lights for that length of
time goes far beyond anything that could fairly be described as a lapse. In my
judgment, it is material that the appellant’s conduct was so egregious that it
was dangerous to other road users. I find it unsatisfactory that a road user
who is acting entirely within and in accordance with the law should be
subjected to a duty to guard against the dangerous (and not merely careless)
conduct of others and this, in my judgement, goes beyond what was contemplated
in either Grant or in Jones.”[34]
50. With regard to the
issue of whether the pedestrian crossing should be treated as two separate
crossings, the minority pointed out that “that centre refuges or islands must
be sufficiently wide so as to afford pedestrians a safe place to stop and look
before continuing to cross.”[35]
51. The above analysis
shows that the majority denied government’s responsibility to ensure road users
right to safety, or life save from injury.
The 4th line of evidence: Mistreatment and abuse in Changi Prison
52. In this section, I
will explain how Changi Prison is imposing authoritarian rule on prisoners from
3 perspectives: health care, disciplinary punishment, and making complaints
about mistreatment. In my opinion, Changi Prison is in a position to carry
considerable improvement to its system.
53. I was sentenced to
prison 3 times and totally spent 15 weeks or so in Changi Prison. My
understanding of prisoner’s rights is that prisoners have an absolute right to
sleep. Eating in prison is not an absolute right and it is a duty as well
because prisoners on hunger strike will invariably face disciplinary
punishment. While prisoners generally have a right to medical treatment, they
don’t have a right to refuse treatment even if the doctors’ diagnosis is
arbitrary.
54. With regard to health
care in Changi Prison, the problem that the prison is facing is the low level
of professional competence, especially the misdiagnosis of psychiatric
disorders. On Oct 27, 2016, prison psychiatrist Rajesh Jacob totally
disregarded the official diagnosis made by the Institute of Mental Health (IMH)
6 months ago and diagnosed me with “delusional disorder of persecutory type” after
he talked to me for a few minutes. On the next day, I was forcibly transported
to the IMH. Dr. Jacob even prescribed anti-psychotic medications to me, as the
IMH documents later revealed. When I was sentenced to prison again in July
2017, I was surprised to find that I was automatically put on medication for
consecutive 4 days.
55. On August 3rd,
2017, I was on a hunger strike after I was forcibly placed by Superintendent
Tan Bin Kiat in a solitary confinement cell in prison medical ward. A physician at medical ward ignored the
official diagnosis issued by the IMH on July 18, 2017 and insisted that I
suffered from mental disorders after I told him a short hunger strike could not
cause malnutrition because fat stored in the body could provide energy for cell
metabolism. This doctor refused to identified himself. There was no way to file
a complaint against a doctor. In the next few days, 4 psychiatrists talked to
me and 3 of them were interested in finding out whether I considered my life meaningless.
However, none of them was willing to testify in court about their suspicion of
my mental condition. When I was released from the prison on Oct 9, 2017, this physician
still wished to refer me to the IMH. Although none of prison doctors talked to
me throughout my most recent jail term, I still received a referral letter to
the IMH when I was released on Jan 2, 2018.
56. With regard to
disciplinary punishment, the prison management ought to be criticized. First of
all, there is a lack of legal assistance in Changi Prison because none of
prison officers are legally trained. Prison officers had to write to the Ministry
of Home Affairs when legal issue arose. The officers were unable to inform
prisoners about their rights and duties. What a prisoner was supposed to know was
to follow officers’ orders. Although local and foreign prisoners live together,
only Singaporeans (or maybe PRs) are required to take a blood test for HIV. In
response to my question, prison authorities adamantly refused to justify this
explicit discrimination but blamed me for making trouble.
57. Secondly, there
was a use of excessive force on prisoners. On August 2nd, 2017, Superintendent
Tan Bin Kiat supervised a restraint operation on me in response to my hunger
strike against solitary confinement. In my opinion, Superintendent Tan should
be more careful with restraint operations and the use of excessive force
because the operation previously caused the death of an inmate in 2013.[36] Unlike
medical staff in the IMH, prison officers like to fix prisoners’ head to
control them and thus injury prisoners’ neck and may obstruct their respiratory
tract.
58. Thirdly, there is abuse
of power in adjudication hearings and investigations officers under provost are
not fair at all. It is a routine for hearing adjudicators including Superintendent
Sze Chuck Huang not to issue any written documents which include a
prisoner’s misconduct and the prison rule he had breached. I have never heard that
an adjudicator issued grounds of his decision or that an appeal against an adjudicator’s
decision was allowed even if prisoners were caned. In September 2017, I was
punished for staging a hunger strike and got a warning from an adjudicator. In
December 2017, Superintendent Sze Chuck Huang punished me by putting me in
solitary confinement for 3 days during which I staged a hunger strike against the
miscarriage of justice. When I asked an adjudicator why I wasn’t punished for staging
the hunger strike in solitary confinement cell, there was no response.
59. With regard to
making complaints about mistreatment, there is a lack of accountability
mechanisms in Changi Prison. It is a fact that prison authorities don’t accept complaints
against the prison and has never provided me with a written reply even my
complaints were against prison officers. In response to my request to write to
the Supreme Court, Superintendent Teo Hock Soon required me to submit a draft
letter and then there was no reply at all after I submitted the draft.
Conclusion
60. I believe the
information I provide above to demonstrate that the PAP government is
maintaining authoritarian rule through its legal system.
Yan Jun
(Singapore NRIC: S7684361I)
February 14, 2018
[1] Tey, T.H. (2010). Criminalising critique of the Singapore
judiciary. Hong Kong Law Journal Vol.40 (3), pp. 751.
[3] My prosecution was politically motivated: former NUS law professor.
Yahoo Newsroom28 February 2014. See: https://sg.news.yahoo.com/my-prosecution-was-politically-motivated--former-nus-law-professor-065210900.html
[4] YouTube video Judicial corruption in Singapore, See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Q15qeptsXk.
[5] Section 69(1) of the Women’s
Charter (Chapter 353). See: https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/WC1961
[6]
Ibid, Section
46(1).
[7]How to apply for maintenance, See: https://www.familyjusticecourts.gov.sg/TBD/Pages/How-to-Apply-for-Maintenance.aspx
[8] Leong, W. K. (1979) A turning
point in Singapore family law: Women's charter (Amendment) Bill 1979 Malaya Law
Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (December 1979), pp. 348, last paragraph.
[9] Leong, W. K. (1987) Duty to
Maintain Spouse and Children during Marriage. Malaya Law Review 29, 24, pp.62,
last paragraph.
[10] Tan Cheng Han. Chapter 18: Maintenance
of wives and children. Families in conflict: Theory and applications in
education and counselling (Butterworth Asia, 2000, ISBN: 9812361111), pp.351,
para.2
[11] Palvit Singh v Sawaran Kaur [1990] 1 MLJ lvii.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Unreported [2003] SGDC 99. Or see Elements of Family Law in Singapore (2nd
Ed, LexisNexis,2013) Chapter 13: Maintenance of wife during subsistence of marriage.
pp.487, Para. 3-6.
[14] Asnah bte Ab Rahman v Li Jianlin [2016] SGCA 16, See: http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/case-law/free-law/court-of-appeal-judgments/18397-asnah-bte-ab-rahman-v-li-jianlin
[15] Ibid, Para 114.
[16] Pedestrians with right of way 'must still share responsibility.
Straits Times, Mar 19, 2016. See: http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/pedestrians-with-right-of-way-must-still-share-responsibility
[17] Asnah bte Ab Rahman v Li Jianlin [2016] SGCA 16, Para 125.
[18] Ibid, Para 23.
[19] Ibid, Para 25.
[20] Ibid, Para 26 and Note 1.
[21] Ibid, Para 26.
[22] Ibid, Para 37.
[23] Ibid, Para 127 (c).
[24] Para 51.
[25] Ibid, Para 49-52.
[26] Supra, note 15.
[27] Ibid, para 12.
[28] Ibid, Para 114.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Spence
v. Southern Pine Elec. Co-Op. 643 So. 2d 970 (1994). See: https://law.justia.com/cases/alabama/supreme-court/1994/1920844-1.html. Or Comparative/Contributory negligence and Joint and several liability.
by American Bar Association 2009, pp.1. para 3. See: http://www.axilonlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/50_State_Compendium_-Final_reduced_size.pdf
[31] Yan Jun v Attorney-General [2014] SGCA 60, Para 36, citing Lord
Denning in Letang v Cooper [1965] 1
QB 232 at 240-241. See: http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/case-law/free-law/court-of-appeal-judgments/15807-yan-jun-v-attorney-general-2014-sgca-60
[32] Supra note 30.
[33]
Asnah
bte Ab Rahman v Li Jianlin
[2016] SGCA 16, Para 116.
[34] Ibid, Para 150.
[35] Ibid, Para 157.
[36] Prison officer fined S$10k for
causing inmate’s death. Today, Jul 22, 2013. See: http://www.todayonline.com/singapore/prison-officer-fined-s10k-causing-inmates-death
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