Why I am suing the police and the Attorney-General

1. I, the plaintiff, filed a suit S 257/2013 on 1 April in the High Court against the Attorney-General (AG) for wrongful arrest/false imprisonment (against the police), malicious prosecution (against the police) and abuse of process (against the AG) etc.

2. The learned AR ruled on 3 July that most claims should be struck out because they were time barred by a 3-year filing limitation period and were not supported by the facts. The plaintiff’s appeal (RA 227/2013) was dismissed on 21 August without giving grounds.

3. While the judgments have been made in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff would argue with respect that the counsel of the defendant’s analysis unreasonable as it is against the common sense and the well-established legal principles. The plaintiff would request the AG to confirm the counsel’s position regarding the following two questions in public.

4. There are two questions at the heart of this case. One is whether a claim for damages for false imprisonment equals to a claim for damages for loss of liberty. The other question is whether an arrested person ought to be produced before a Magistrate within 48 hours of the arrest.

Facts

5. While arrived in the plaintiff’s flat in response to the plaintiff’s call for assistance on 19 July 2009, the police officer prohibited the plaintiff from making a report and arrested him for a breach of Personal Protection Order (PPO). The plaintiff was detained in the police station overnight and released the next day on police bail. The PPO was later discovered to be expired two weeks before the arrest and the police consulted the Attorney-General’s Chambers (AGC) some 2 months later.  

6. The AGC satisfied the lawfulness of the arrest and accepted the incident as an investigation so directed the police to take no further action, as no offence was disclosed. The plaintiff was neither charged nor was brought before a Magistrate.

Limitation period

7. The general limitation period for filing an action against such a legal wrong (tort) is 6 years (6-year rule) [1] but it can be 3 years (3-year rule) [2] if the legal wrong satisfies both two criteria. One is that the wrong is caused by negligence or nuisance or breach of duty; the other is that the claim for damages is a personal injury claim.

8. Personal injury “includes any disease and any impairment of a person’s physical or mental condition” [3]. The most common types of personal injury claims are road traffic accidents and damages cover compensation for pain and suffering, emotional distress, medical expenses, loss of earnings, etc. However, it is well-established that the loss of liberty (loss of dignity and harm to reputation) is not a form of "injury" [4].

English Court’s position

9. House of Lord of the UK held that a claim for damages for false imprisonment was a personal injury claim and that false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability.

10. The Lord Woolf MR has made it clear that “there can be two elements to an award of damages for false imprisonment; the first being compensation for loss of liberty and the second being the damage to reputation, humiliation, shock, injury to feelings and so on which can be result from the loss of liberty” [5]. A suspect restrained in a room in a hotel will never experience the sense of hopelessness, or the power of the imprisonment. Lord Hope said plainly that “The tort of false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability” [6].  

11. The English Court of Appeal held that the limitation period for a suit of false imprisonment was 6 years [7]. On 18 Nov 2011, Lianhe zaobao reported a local wrongful arrest/false imprisonment suit ([2011] SGDC 311) in which the AG applied to strike it out on the ground of 6-year rule, which was confirmed by the High Court. 

 

The counsel’s position

12. The counsel has argued that a claim for damages for false imprisonment equals to a claim for damages for loss of liberty only so is not a personal injuries claim [8]. When requested to justify the difference between his and Lord Woolf’s position, the counsel kept silent.

   

13. Without challenging the Lord Hope’s judgment, the counsel argued [9] the false imprisonment is founded on breach of duty by citing the seminal concept formulated by Lord Denning [10] that “there is a duty owed by every man not to injure his neighbor in a way forbidden by law. … So is false imprisonment, malicious prosecution or defamation of character”.

14.While a police office may breach his general duty if he locks his wife against her will, this officer’s use of force against a suspect when putting him under arrest will not be forbidden by law. Despite of the basic presumption that people go about their own business in their own interests, the police act in the public interest and make decisions by their professional assessments but not their subject beliefs of the guilt of suspects. The counsel didn’t challenge this view.  

15. If the counsel is right on the breach of duty, the judgment of 2011 case will be wrong because a claim for damages for false imprisonment is obviously a personal injury claim. When questioned the correctness of the judgment of 2011 case, the counsel kept silent.  

Lack of prosecution and judicial process

16.The counsel argued that the plaintiff’s claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process fail as the plaintiff was not prosecuted [11] and there was no judicial proceeding against him [12]. To prosecute is to set the law in motion by an appeal to some people clothed with judicial authority [13], so now the question is whether it is an arrested person’s fundamental right to be brought by the police officers who present the evidence before the Magistrate to set the law in motion. (I don’t touch on the issue of the “Malice” here due to space limits).

48-Hour rule and probable cause hearing

17. While a police officer is allowed to arrest a suspect without a warrant, the suspect is entitled to an independent judicial review of the probable cause of arrest against arbitrary detention. Article 9(4) of the Constitution provides that “Where a person is arrested and not released, he shall, without unreasonable delay, and in any case within 48 hours (excluding the time of any necessary journey), be produced before a Magistrate”.

18.The counsel argued that “there was no requirement at law for the plaintiff to be brought before a Magistrate” because “he was detained less than 24 hours before he was released on bail” [14]. When questioned whether the custody officer should brought the plaintiff in front of a Magistrate before he was released on bail, the counsel answered that this question was irrelevant to the case. A probable cause hearing is a judicial process meant to protect the arrested persons against arbitrary arrest.  

19. If the 48-Hour rule doesn't run from the point of the arrest, the police will be constitutionally entitled to deprive a person of his right to liberty by arresting, detaining and releasing this person. This interpretation contradicts the article 9(1) of the Constitution that provides “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law”.

20. Suppose that a person failed to answer a police bail because the police station’s guard intentionally refused to let him in. The failure to answer the bail ought to be disproved by the Court as it was founded on the violation of his due-process rights. 

21. The AG has no power to interfere with a person’s constitutional right [15] so the AG’s direction not to produce the plaintiff before a Magistrate is unlawful and technically helped the police escape their liability for unlawful arrest. As such, the plaintiff’s non-attendance before a Magistrate should be disproved by the Court and in this sense the counsel’s defence fails.

22.The arrest is caused by the police officer’s ignorance of law but the AG has intentionally violated the plaintiff’s constitutional right when the AG was informed of the unlawful arrest. The plaintiff thinks that the AG has made greater mistakes by contradicting his role in administering justice to the society. 

23.The plaintiff requests the Attorney-General to justify his position in public, especially his position on an arrested person’s right for probable cause hearing. The plaintiff requests the High Court to release the grounds of the decision at the trial’s judge’s earliest convenience.  

. Thank you for your attention.

Mr. Yan

Reference:

1. Section 6 (1)(a) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163)
2. Section 24A of the Limitation Act (Cap 163)
3. Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163)
4. New South Wales v Williamson [2012] HCA 57 at para 34
5. R v Governor HM Prison Brockhill [1998] EWCA Civ 1042
6. R v Governor of Brockhill Prisoner ex parte Evans [2000] UKHL 48
7. Padmore v Commissioner of Police (Unreported) 15 November 2000, False imprisonment by Nigel Joseph Ley (ISBN: 0853086893) at Page 269.
8. Defendant’s skeletal Submission for RA No. 227/2013 page 25, footnote 47.
9. Defendant’s skeletal Submission for RA No. 227/2013 page 10, para 34.
10. Letang v Cooper [1964] EWCA Civ 5 at page 241
11. Defendant’s skeletal Submission for RA No. 227/2013 page 26, para 70(1)
12. Defendant’s skeletal Submission for RA No. 227/2013 page 28, para 74
13. Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (18ed, 2000), page 825, papa 16-08
14. Defendant’s skeletal Submission for RA No. 227/2013 page 28, para 73.
15. Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis [2008] 2 SLR 239 at 148